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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE.  The debtor was the president and a
director of a grain dealer corporation that was also in
bankruptcy. The trustee in the corporation’s case sought an
order denying the discharge of the debtor under Section
727(a)(3) for falsification of records to the state department
of agriculture and the corporation’s auditors. The debtor
argued that Section 727(a)(3) applied only where the
falsification prevented the trustee from obtaining accurate
financial records and did not apply to falsification as to third
parties. The court held that because the debtor’s actions did
not prevent the trustee from obtaining accurate records in
the bankruptcy case, the discharge would not be denied. The
court noted that the corporation’s own poor records
prevented the trustee from obtaining accurate information.
The trustee also sought to deny the debtor’s discharge under
Section 523(a)(2) for tendering false financial records to the
state department of agriculture, resulting in continuation of
the corporation’s grain dealer license, credit purchases from
some producers, and the corporation's failure to pay for
these purchases. The court held that the trustee could not
bring a dischargeability action on behalf of only some of the
corporation’s creditors. The trustee in the corporation’s case
also sought denial of discharge of the debtor for fraud while
in a position of fiduciary duty. The court held that a director
of a corporation does not serve as a fiduciary as to the
corporation’s creditors. In re Martin, 162 B.R. 710
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1993).
ESTATE PROPERTY. Two years before filing for
bankruptcy, the debtors had established a revocable trust
with the debtors as trustees and beneficiaries. The debtors
had the right to revoke the trust at any time. The court held
that the right to revoke the trust was a property interest
which passed to the bankruptcy estate and the trustee had
the power to revoke the trust. In re Ross, 162 B.R. 863
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1993).
EXEMPTIONS.
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  After subtraction of the
consensual liens against the debtor’s homestead, the debtor
had equity in excess of the exemption amount. The debtor
argued that the fair market value of the house should be
reduced by the hypothetical costs of sale, but the court
rejected that valuation because the house was not going to
be sold. The debtor sought to avoid a judgment lien against
the house which partially impaired the exemption, arguing
that the entire lien should be avoided so that the debtor
would receive any future appreciation. The court held that
the judgment lien would be avoided only to the extent the
lien impaired the exemption. In re Abrahimzadeh, 162
B.R. 676 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1994).
HOUSEHOLD GOODS. The debtor claimed an
exemption, under Va. Code § 34-29, for two televisions, a
record player and a VCR. The court held that the items were
household goods eligible for the exemption. In re Hanes,
162 B.R. 733 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994).
OBJECTIONS. The debtor originally filed a Chapter 13
case and claimed $3,000 in property as exempt. No
objections to the exemptions were filed. The case was
converted to Chapter 7 and another creditors’ examination
took place and the trustee filed an objection to the
exemptions within 30 days after the examination. The
debtor argued that the objection was invalid as untimely
because it was not filed within 30 days after the Chapter 13
creditors’ examination. Although the court recognized that
the rules did not explicitly provide for a new time limit for
objections after a conversion, the court held that the
conversion restarted the time limit for objections to
exemptions and that the trustee’s objection was timely. In re
Jenkins, 162 B.R. 589 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
RETIREMENT PLANS. The debtor owned an interest
in two retirement plans established by two companies for
their retired directors. The plans were paid from the
companies’ general revenues on an annual basis and did not
create any fund or trust corpus. The plans were not ERISA
qualified. The plans had spendthrift clauses restricting the
debtor’s transfer rights as to future payments. The court held
that the plans did not create trusts excludible from the
bankruptcy estate. In re Hanes, 162 B.R. 733 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE. The FmHA
sought conversion of the debtor’s Chapter 12 case to
Chapter 7 for fraud in attempting to hide assets belonging to
the bankruptcy estate. During the Rule 2004 examination of
the debtor, the FmHA discovered that the debtor had not
disclosed in the bankruptcy schedules bank account funds
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resulting from the sale of collateral securing an FmHA loan
to the debtor. The debtor stated that the debtor in
preparation for the bankruptcy filing had told the debtor’s
attorney’s certified legal assistant (CLA) that the account
existed. The FmHA sought to depose the CLA but the
debtor invoked the client-attorney privilege to bar the CLA
from giving any information about the preparation of the
bankruptcy schedules. The court held that the privilege did
not exist in this case because the information involved only
the financial facts required to be reported by all debtors. In
addition, even if the privilege existed, the debtor lost the
privilege when the debtor disclosed that the CLA had been
given the information about the account. In re French, 162
B.R. 541 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1994).
ELIGIBILITY. For the taxable year preceding the
filing for Chapter 12, the debtor’s Schedule F gross income
included income from the sale of farm equipment and
income from custom farming work done for third parties.
The court held that the income from these items was farm
income for Chapter 12 eligibility purposes because the
income was listed under Schedule F, the items involved
farming and the income was used in the farm operation. In
re Barnett, 162 B.R. 535 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993).
PLAN .  A secured creditor objected to the debtor’s
Chapter 12 plan as unfeasible. The plan was based on
increased income from the sale of timber and hay, profit
from a cattle operation for which the debtor had only
tentative funding, and income from the debtor’s two
nonfarm jobs. The court confirmed the plan, holding that
most of the increase in profits from the hay and timber sales
and the cattle operation was not needed to adequately fund
the plan and that if the debtor was unable or unwilling to
maintain the two jobs and defaulted on the plan, the creditor
was protected by its ability to bring foreclosure upon default
by the debtor. In re Barnett, 162 B.R. 535 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE. More than two years before the debtor
filed for bankruptcy, the debtor met with an IRS agent about
unpaid federal income taxes from previous years. The agent
and the debtor filled out substitute Forms 1902-B for each
year and filled in the personal information on Forms 1040
for each year. The debtor signed only the 1902-B Forms.
The debtor sought a ruling that the substitute forms
constituted filings for purposes of Section 523(a)(1)(B)(i),
allowing the discharge of taxes for which a return was filed
more than two years before the bankruptcy filing. The court
held that although, in most cases, a substitute form filled out
by the IRS did not constitute a filing, where the debtor signs
the forms as an acknowledgement of the debtor’s liability
for the taxes, the substitute forms would constitute a filing
for purposes of Section 523(a)(1)(B)(i). In re Lowrie, 162
B.R. 864 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1994).
CONTRACTS
MUTUAL MISTAKE. The plaintiff sold several
combines to the defendant who traded-in several pieces of
farm equipment as part of the downpayment. The plaintiff
filled out the contract of sale and listed all of the equipment
but failed to subtract from the value of two tractors, liens
against the tractors. Before the error was discovered, the
plaintiff had taken possession of the tractors and paid the
liens against them. The contract was modified four months
after the signing of the original contract but the error was
still not discovered until three months after the contract was
amended. The plaintiff sought reformation of the contract
for mutual mistake or unjust enrichment. The defendant
argued that the plaintiff should be bound by the terms of the
contract because the contract was written by the plaintiff,
the plaintiff had the responsibility for determining the value
of the traded-in pieces, the defendant relied on the “bottom-
line” cost of the contract, and any mistake was made only
by the plaintiff in failing to identify the liens in the value of
the traded-in tractors. The court held that a mutual mistake
occurred in that both parties accepted the contract valuation
of the tractors; therefore, the plaintiff was awarded the cost
of payment for those liens. York Equipment, Inc. v.
Ashwill, 510 N.W.2d 79 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993).
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IMPAIRMENT. The
plaintiff was a farm implement dealer. The defendant was a
farm implement manufacturer which had purchased the
manufacturing of farm implements from a bankruptcy
company. When the plaintiff went out of business, the
plaintiff sought, under N.C. Code § 51-07-01, to have the
defendant accept in payment for a debt the returned
inventory of spare parts purchased from the previous
company which were still listed in the defendant’s price list
and catalog. The defendant argued that its purchase of the
former company was free and clear of any prior obligations
of the company and that N.C. Code § 51-07-01
unconstitutionally impaired that contract by requiring the
defendant to accept the plaintiff’s prior inventory. The court
held that the defendant was not impaired by having to
accept parts currently on its price list and that even if the
contract was impaired, the state had a significant public
purpose in protecting distributors of vehicles and farm
implements of companies which are sold to new owners.
Farmers Union Oil Co. v. Allied Products Corp., 162
B.R. 834 (D. N.D. 1993).
ENVIRONMENT
GROUND POLLUTION-ALM § 2.03[2].* The
defendants were previous owners of the plaintiff’s land and
had operated a gas processing plant on the property. The
plant dumped several toxic contaminants on the soil,
polluting the ground and water with continuing pollution
effects. The plaintiff used the property for farming and
brought an action in continuing nuisance, continuing
trespass and negligence. The defendants argued that the
actions in nuisance and trespass were improper because one
cannot create a nuisance or trespass on one’s own property.
The court held that an action in continuing nuisance and
continuing trespass could be brought by a subsequent
owner. The defendants also argued that the defendant was
not in the class of persons to which the defendant’s owed a
duty to disclose the contamination because the plaintiff was
not the first purchaser from the defendants.  The court held
that because the contamination violated public statutes
against pollution, the plaintiff was one of the class of
persons protected by the statute. Newhall Land & Farming
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v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr.2d 377 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
COMMUNITY LOANS. The FmHA has adopted as
final regulations providing for the Community Facility loans
to assist rural communities of 5,000 or less inhabitants in
obtaining adequate drinking water. 59 Fed. Reg. 11530
(March 11, 1994).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04[1].* The FCIC has
adopted as final regulations consolidating the policy
provisions for small grains (wheat, barley, flax, oats and
rye) into one policy and providing for coverage for late
planting, prevented planting, malting barley and winter
wheat. 59 Fed. Reg. 9382 (Feb. 28, 1994).
The FCIC has issued interim regulations for crop
insurance for figs to offer insurance on figs with added
coverage for quality adjustment. 59 Fed. Reg. 9614 (March
1, 1994).
DISASTER PAYMENTS-ALM § 10.03[4].* The CCC
has adopted as final regulations amending the livestock
emergency programs (1) to simplify the method of
determining total livestock feed needs, (2) to change the
method of determining pasture value, (3) to apply the
$50,000 payment limitation to crop years instead of calender
years, and (4) to alter the method of calculating interest on
refunds due the CCC. 59 Fed. Reg. 9918 (March 2, 1994).
In 1991, the plaintiff suffered loss of a cotton crop due to
excessive rains and applied to the ASCS for disaster credit.
The local committee denied a portion of the request by
reducing the yield because it found that the plaintiff had
planted the cotton using substandard farming techniques in
that the land was too wet and grassy. The committee hearing
included testimony from other local cotton farmers as to
planting techniques and crop successes in 1991. The court
held that the ASCS denial of a portion of the disaster
benefits was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported
by the evidence presented. Brouillette v. U.S.D.A., 840 F.
Supp. 55 (W.D. La. 1993).
HERBICIDES. The plaintiff was a family farm
corporation which applied to its soybean crop a herbicide
manufactured by the defendant. The label on the herbicide
stated that rotational crops could be planted on applied acres
18 months after the application. The plaintiff planted sugar
beets on the land in subsequent crop years which suffered
carryover damage. The defendant had meanwhile changed
the label to provide for a 24 month waiting period before
planting of rotational crops. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant was negligent in not properly labeling the
herbicide with the proper carryover period. The court held
that the negligence claim was expressly preempted by
FIFRA. Quad R Farms v. American Cyanamid Co., 840
F. Supp. 694 (D. Minn. 1993).
MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION. The FSIS
has issued proposed regulations amending the meat
inspection regulations for meat production using advanced
meat/bone separation machinery and recovery systems. 59
Fed. Reg. 10246 (March 3, 1994).
The FSIS has announced that it is considering proposed
regulations amending the regulations governing poultry
products produced by mechanical deboning and is seeking
public comment. 59 Fed. Reg. 10230 (March 3, 1994).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].* A produce company sold fresh
produce to the debtor. For several months, the sales were
made with no agreement on when payment was due for the
produce. The produce company alleged that at some time it
sent a letter to the debtor which set a 30 day payment period
for all shipments and the invoices began to state that
payment was due in 30 days. However, the produce
company provided no evidence of when the letter was sent
or signed by the debtor. The court held that the alleged
agreement was ineffective to establish extended payment
terms for purposes of the PACA trust requirements. The
court also held that the payment terms statements on the
invoices were insufficient to establish the extended payment
terms because the invoices arrived after the produce was
received by the debtor.  In re Lombardo Fruit & Produce
Co., 12 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 150 B.R. 941 (E.D.
Mo. 1993), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, 106 B.R. 593
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989).
CORRECTION: The citation for In re Lombardo Fruit
& Produce Co., Vol 5, No 6, p. 45, should have read as
follows:In re Lombardo Fruit & Produce Co., 12 F.3d
806 (8th Cir. 1993), rev’g in part and aff’g in part, 150
B.R. 941 (E.D. Mo. 1993), aff’g in part and rev’g in part,
107 B.R. 952 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989). The summary
should have included the following sentence at the end:
“The appellate court reversed, holding that the produce stall
purchase was separate from the produce transactions and did
not affect the seller’s PACA trust benefits; however, the
court held that the seller did not qualify for the PACA trust
because the parties did not have a prior written agreement
for payment terms for the produce sales.
PEANUTS. The ASCS has adopted as final regulations
establishing the 1994 national poundage quota for quota
peanuts at 1,350,000 short tons. 59 Fed. Reg. 9065 (Feb.
25, 1994).
SOYBEANS. The FGIS has adopted as final regulations
revising the standards for soybeans. 59 Fed. Reg. 10569
(March 7, 1994).
TUBERCULOSIS. The APHIS has adopted as final
regulations adding a classification “Accredited-free
(suspended) State” for a state whose accredited-free status
has been suspended because of detection of tuberculosis in
cattle or bison in the state. 59 Fed. Reg. 9071 (Feb. 25,
1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
taxpayer established an irrevocable charitable lead unitrust
providing an annual payment to a charitable organization of
6 percent of the net fair market value of trust property at the
beginning of each taxable year for the lifetime of the
taxpayer. The remainder of the trust passed to the taxpayer’s
family members. The taxpayer’s guardian, through a probate
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court order transferred a specified sum to the trust and had
the power to make subsequent contributions. The IRS ruled
that annual distribution to the charity would be deductible
from the trust taxable income, that the transfer of property to
the trust would, in part be eligible for a charitable gift tax
deduction, and that the trust corpus would not be included in
the taxpayer’s gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9406030, Nov. 17,
1993.
The taxpayer established a ten-year irrevocable
charitable lead unitrust providing an annual payment to a
charitable organization of 8 percent of the initial fair market
value of trust property at the trust’s inception. The
remainder of the trust passed to the taxpayer’s family
members. The taxpayer retained the right to substitute
property of equal value for the trust corpus. The IRS ruled
that annual distribution to the charity would be deductible
from the trust taxable income, that the value of the annuity
interest was eligible for a charitable income tax deduction,
and that the trust corpus would not be included in the
taxpayer’s gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9407014, Nov. 18, 1993.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX-ALM
§ 5.04[6].* A decedent’s will transferred stock in a family
corporation to two irrevocable pre-1985 trusts for the
decedent’s children and grandchildren. The trusts were
identical except for the beneficiaries. The two primary
beneficiaries decided to split the business into two separate
businesses and proposed to modify the trusts to have each
trust own the stock from its own business. The beneficiaries
also modified the trustee voting powers. The IRS ruled that
the modifications to the trusts would not subject the trusts to
GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9406033, Nov. 17, 193.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s will bequeathed property to a charitable pooled
income trust which provided for monthly payments to the
decedent’s surviving spouse from the income from the
bequeathed property. At the death of the surviving spouse,
the bequeathed property passed to the charitable
organization. No person had a right to appoint the trust
property to any person other than the surviving spouse. The
IRS ruled that the bequest of the property to the pooled
income trust was eligible for the marital deduction as QTIP.
Ltr. Rul. 9406013, Nov. 10, 1993.
The IRS has adopted as final regulations governing
QTIP. The IRS acknowledged that Pennsylvania Nat’l
Bank & Trust Co. v. U.S., 387 U.S. 213 (1967)  held that a
right to receive a specified periodic payment from a trust
qualified as a right to receive a specific portion of the trust
for purposes of the marital deduction. However, the final
regulations adopted the definition of “specific portion”
enacted by Pub. L. No. 102–486, § 1941, 106 Stat. 2823
(1992), adding I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(10), 2523(e)(2), to include
only interests determined on a fractional or percentage basis.
The Pennsylvania holding was still applicable for estates
and gifts made prior to the effective date of the 1992 act.
The final regulations also changed the proposed regulations
to add that the executor was responsible for making the
QTIP election as to property not in the estate, e.g., an
intervivos trust. The final regulations also added the
availability of a protective QTIP election if at the time of the
filing of the return, a bona fide issue remains as to the
amount or nature of the property received by the surviving
spouse or whether an asset is included in the gross estate.
Although the IRS acknowledged two federal appeals courts’
decisions to the contrary, Est. of Robertson v. Comm'r, 94-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,153 (8th Cir. 1994), rev’g, 98
T.C. 678 (1992) see p. 45 supra; Est. of Clayton v. Comm’r,
976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992), rev’g, 97 T.C. 327 (1991),
the final regulations provide that QTIP property does not
include trust property passing to the surviving spouse
contingent upon the executor’s election to treat the property
as QTIP. 59 Fed. Reg. 9642 (March 1, 1994).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS . A corporation was not
allowed deductions for repairs made to a house owned by
the corporation but used by the corporation’s sole
shareholder as a residence. The court held that the
deductions were disallowed because the repairs benefitted
only the shareholder. In addition, the court held that the
repairs constituted constructive dividends to the shareholder.
Gill v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-92.
COOPERATIVES-ALM § 14.03.* The taxpayer was a
subchapter T nonexempt cooperative. The taxpayer argued
that the taxpayer was not subject to alternative minimum tax
(AMT) because a cooperative was not able to apply any
minimum tax credit to reduce the AMT in taxable years that
the regular tax exceeded the tentative minimum tax. The
IRS did not respond to the taxpayer’s argument but ruled
that cooperatives are subject to the AMT under statutory
construction, the regulations and the legislative history. The
ruling notes that patronage dividends can be deducted from
AMT; therefore, if a cooperative distributes all of its
income, the cooperative would not have any AMT liability.
Ltr. Rul. 9407001, Nov. 2, 1993.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayer’s employment was terminated and
the company offered the taxpayer a higher termination
settlement if the taxpayer signed a release of all claims
against the company. The taxpayer signed the release and
sought to exclude the settlement payment as a personal
injury settlement payment. The court held that because the
release involved all claims against the company, the
taxpayer could not show that the settlement was received for
any injury to the taxpayer and the settlement must be
included in the taxpayer’s taxable income. Taggi v. U.S.,
94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,085 (S.D. N.Y. 1993).
DISASTER AREAS-ALM § 4.05[2].*  The IRS has
announced the disaster areas designated by the President for
December 4, 1992 through December 31, 1993 for purposes
of eligibility of taxpayers to qualify for I.R.C. § 164(i)
deferral of claiming losses from those disasters. Rev. Rul.
94-14, I.R.B. 1994-9, 38.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-A L M §
4.02[15].* In 1990, the taxpayer settled a recourse debt for
less than fair market value, thus realizing discharge of
indebtedness income. The taxpayer was insolvent at the time
of the transaction. However, the taxpayer’s tax return
preparer mistakenly claimed the income as capital gains.
After an audit in 1993, the error was discovered and the
taxpayer applied to the IRS for an extension of time to file
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the I.R.C. § 108(b)(5) election for insolvent taxpayers to
reduce the basis of other assets to the extent of the income
from the discharge of indebtedness. The IRS ruled that good
cause was shown and allowed the extension. Ltr. Rul.
9406015, Nov. 12, 1993.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayers were
a doctor and spouse who operated a horse breeding and
racing business. The court held that the business was not
operated for profit, thus limiting deductions to income,
because the taxpayers’ recordkeeping was insufficient to
evaluate the success of the business, the taxpayers did not
seek financial advice to make the business profitable and the
taxpayers had a history of losses from other cattle breeding
and real estate rental businesses. Meaney v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1994-94.
LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* Starting in the 1920’s, the
taxpayer and its predecessor had purchased dairies all over
the United States in order to establish a national business for
dairy products. The taxpayer ceased the operations of many
of the dairies in the 1970’s and claimed losses for
abandonment of intangibles associated with those dairies,
including production efficiency, distribution system,
customer bases, trade names and “a reliable source of
supply.” In a massive opinion discussing each dairy, the
court held that, except for the intangible of “a reliable
source of supply,” the taxpayer failed to either show
abandonment of the intangible asset or that the asset had any
value separate from goodwill (which would allow only a
capital loss deduction). Kraft, Inc. v. U.S., 94-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,080 (Fed. Cls. 1994).
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[3].* The
taxpayer owned land and a building and leased the property
to a wholly-owned S corporation under a May 1983 lease.
The corporation operated a business on the property in
which the taxpayer materially participated. The taxpayer
sold the property to the corporation with resulting taxable
gain. The taxpayer’s rental of the property to the corporation
constituted a passive activity and the taxpayer had
previously disallowed passive activity deductions. The IRS
ruled that the gain from the sale of the property was passive
gross activity income and could be offset by previously
disallowed passive activity deductions. Ltr. Rul. 9406010,
Nov. 9, 1993.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in February
1994, the weighted average is 7.37 percent with the
permissible range of 6.64 to 8.11 percent for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 94-19, I.R.B. 1994-10, 16.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced filing extensions
for farmers who were prevented from timely filing of
returns by March 1, 1994 because of ice storms in
Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana. IRS News
Release Feb. 18, 22, 24, 1994.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
EMBLEMENTS-ALM § 13.05.* The decedent was a
life tenant of farm land and had cropshare leased the land.
The decedent died after crops had been planted on the land
but before the crops were harvested. The plaintiff was the
remainder holder of the title to the farm land and sought
recovery of the decedent’s share of the crop. The defendants
were the decedent’s estate and heirs who claimed the crop
share under the doctrine of emblements under Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 91.230. The court held that the plaintiff remainder holder
was entitled to the crop share because the doctrine of
emblements did not apply. The court held that the doctrine
of emblements did not apply because the doctrine protected
a tenant’s rights to a planted crop and not the lessor’s rights
to the crop. As between successors of a lessor, the
determination is about rent from the property and not crops
planted by the lessor, although the court conceded that a
different result could apply if the lessor’s involvement in the
crop was greater. Simpson v. McCormmach, 866 P.2d 489
(Or. Ct. App. 1994).
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
DUTY TO MAINTAIN DITCH. The plaintiffs owned
a hay meadow which gently sloped into a ditch which ran
from the plaintiff’s property through the defendant’s
property. The plaintiff had dredged the ditch, including the
portion on the defendant’s property, several times over 30
years in order to allow the meadow to drain sufficiently to
grow canary grass as a cattle pasture. The defendant refused
to clear the ditch in 1983 and thereafter, claiming that the
ditch had been dredged too deeply, causing diminished
crops on the land surrounding the ditch. The plaintiff argued
that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 31-224 required the defendant to
annually clean the ditch of all obstructions. The defendant
argued and the trial court held that the statute applied only
to obstructions caused by the defendant and that the ditch
filled in with natural erosion. The appellate court held that
the statute applied to require cleaning if the defendant had
knowledge of the obstruction, whether or not caused by the
defendant. Barthel v. Liermann, 509 N.W.2d 660 (Neb.
Ct. App. 1993).
SURFACE WATER. The plaintiff owned farm land
downgrade from the defendant. The defendant replaced a
culvert under a driveway, causing water on over 200 acres
to flow suddenly over the plaintiff’s land, flooding several
fields and destroying roads and culverts. The defendant also
breached a dike which also sent 70 acres of water flowing
over the plaintiff’s land and caused flooding and silt
deposits. The court held that although the defendant had the
right to drain surface water onto the plaintiff’s land, the
drainage must be done in a reasonable and careful manner
and without negligence. The court found that the defendant
acted negligently in failing to obtain professional advice in
replacing the culvert and breaching the dike so as to
minimize the damage to the plaintiff’s property; therefore,
the defendant was liable for the damages caused by the
draining. Hickman v. Hunkins, 509 N.W.2d 220 (Neb. Ct.
App. 1992).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
REPOSSESSION-ALM § 13.01[6].*  After the plaintiff
defaulted on a loan, the defendant bank sent two employees
to repossess the farm equipment collateral for the loan. The
employees arrived when only the plaintiff’s twelve year old
son was present and moved a horse to the back of the barn
where the horse could reach more food than it should eat,
resulting in injury to the horse from colic. The employees
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                               55
also moved a locked and braked truck, causing damage to
the land and the truck’s brakes. The employees took the
plaintiff’s tractor and a disc owned by the plaintiff’s
neighbor, breaking several blades in the process. After the
plaintiff paid the loan balance and the repossession costs,
the defendant bank refused to return the equipment unless
the plaintiff signed a release of the bank’s liability for
damages caused during the repossession. The plaintiff sued
for conversion for actual and punitive damages. The court
held that the bank was liable for criminal conversion in that
its employees committed criminal mischief in their
unreasonable injury to the plaintiff’s land, horse and
equipment in the repossession. The court held that the
failure of the bank to return the equipment after the plaintiff
paid the loan and costs was also conversion. The court also
held that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of
the value of the property involved and the amount of value
loss from the injury during repossession. The court upheld
the punitive damage award even though actual damages was
reversed, because the law allowed at least nominal damages
for criminal conversion. Star Bank, N.A. v. Laker, 626
N.E.2d 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
SALE OF COLLATERAL-ALM § 13.01[6].* The
debtors operated a fish farm and had granted to a bank
security interests in the fish and equipment. After the
debtors defaulted on the loans, the bank attempted to harvest
the fish and dismantle some of the equipment, However, the
persons hired to harvest the fish were unqualified and did
not have the proper equipment to harvest the fish.
Consequently, many of the fish died before they could be
sold. In addition, some evidence indicated that the persons
hired to harvest the fish sold the fish without reporting the
proceeds to the bank. In attempting to remove the
equipment, much of the equipment was damaged because
the removers did not have adequate knowledge about the
equipment. The debtors sought to bar a deficiency judgment
on the loans because the collateral was not disposed of in a
reasonably commercial manner. The bank argued that this
standard only applied to the sale of the collateral after it was
in the possession of the bank. The court held that the bank
had possession of the fish and equipment because it had
access to the property at all times and that disposition of
collateral included the gathering of the collateral. The court
also held that the bank’s actions amounted to reckless
destruction of the collateral and barred any relief to the bank
in excess of the collateral. Marks v. Powell, 162 B.R. 820
(E.D. Ark. 1993).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
MILK. The plaintiff was a milk marketing cooperative
which had requested the Pa. Milk Marketing Board
(PMMB) to provide that all premiums mandated by PMMB
in two marketing areas be pooled among all eligible Grade
A milk producers.  The PMMB decided to reject the request
because the pooling would result in a disadvantage to
marketers in the two areas because the producers would
receive less for their milk than producers in other areas,
resulting in more difficulty for the marketers to obtain milk
in the two areas. In addition, the PMMB found that the
pooling of premiums would increase administrative costs,
resulting in less payments to the producers in the two areas.
The court held that PMMB decision was supported by
adequate evidence and was rationally based on that
evidence. Milk Marketing, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Marketing
Board, 635 A.2d 1110 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993).
STATE TAXATION
LANDFILL FEE. The plaintiffs were agricultural land
owners who were assessed a per acre fee by the county
which was used to defray the estimated costs of disposing of
wastes generated by agricultural operations in the county.
The plaintiffs argued that the fee was a special tax invalidly
adopted in violation of Calif. Cost. Art. XIII A, Sec. 4,
because the fee was levied without relation to the individual
owner’s use of the landfill. The court held that the fee was
valid as part of the county’s reasonable effort to control
illegal dumping  and to protect the health and environment
of the county citizens. Kern County Farm Bureau v.
County of Kern, 23 Cal. Rptr.2d 910 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993).
TRESPASS
TIMBER. The defendant was a logging company which
contracted with the owners of timberland to harvest trees on
the land.  Although the owners owned full title to most of
the land, the owners only owned a one-fourth undivided
interest in a portion of the land. When the defendant began
to harvest the timber on the tract, the other owners, the
plaintiffs, informed the defendant that the tract was owned
by the plaintiffs but the defendant continued to harvest trees
until prevented by an injunction. The defendant then offered
to remove the cut trees but the plaintiffs did not give such
permission until the trees became unmarketable. The trial
court had instructed the jury that the plaintiff could recover
treble the value of the trees improperly cut if the jury found
that the defendant had acted willfully, wantonly or
maliciously in cutting the trees. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the treble damage statute, W. Va.
Code § 61-3-48a, provided for treble damages if the trees
were cut without written permission of the owners;
therefore, no willful, wanton or malicious act by the
defendant was required. The defendant also argued that the
damages should be reduced because the plaintiffs failed to
mitigate their damages by allowing the defendant to remove
the cut timber in sufficient time to sell the wood at full
market value. The court held that the plaintiffs made a
reasonable effort to protect their property when they first
informed the defendant that the defendant was cutting trees
on their property. Chesser v. Hathaway, 439 S.E.2d 459
(W. Va. 1993).
CITATION UPDATES
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Comm’r, 12 F.3d 1529 (9th Cir.
1993), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, 95 T.C. 415 (1991)
(investment tax credit) see p. 30 supra.
Pepcol Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 13 F.3d 355 (10th Cir.
1993), rev’g, 98 T.C. 127 (1992) (energy investment tax
credit) see p. 38 supra.
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WORKERS’
COMPENSATION
ELIGIBLITY-ALM § 3.05[1].* The appellant was an
insurer of a company which contracted with independent
loggers to harvest timber. The appellee Department of
Insurance and Finance (DIF) had ordered the appellant to
rebate the workers’ compensation insurance premium paid
by the insured for the loggers. The appellant argued that the
loggers were “subject employees” because the insured had
the right to control the work of the loggers and the loggers
could not hire employees without prior permission from the
insured. The court held that the rule was that an employer
must have exercised actual control over the workers in
order for the workers to be subject employees and that in
this case, no control over the harvesting methods was
applied. In addition, the court held that because the logging
contract provided that the loggers were responsible for all
labor costs, the insured did not have control over the hiring
of persons employed by the loggers. Therefore, the loggers
were independent contractors and the insured was not
required to pay workers compensation insurance premiums.
Port Blakely Tree Farms v. Nat’l Council on Comp.
Ins., 865 P.2d 387 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $35
each in 1994.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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